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SUMMARY 
This article analyses the conversion to Islam of indigenous chiefs in North 
Cameroon. The chiefs studied belong to the Mundang ethnic group. Their 
islamisation is interpreted as the outcome of the ambivalence brought about by 
their intermediary role between local society and the wider society. This approach 
offers insights in (a) the connection between conversion and political careers; (b) 
the relation between Islam and ethnic identities; and (c) the popular legitimacy of 
conversion. 
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Introduction 
Most theoretical thinking on ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa is based on 
ethnographic cases in southern Africa. Ethnic processes in the Muslim societies of 
Africa are a relatively neglected field of study, especially the theoretical reflection 
on the relation between Islam and processes of ethnic identity formation and 
dissociation. A notable exception is Cohen's study on Hausa traders in Ibadan (in 
43 Nigeria) (1). Scholars of Islam in West Africa have generally stressed the alleged 
universalist influence of Islam, and have neglected its potential for particularism. 
However, the latter force is very important in order to understand the ethnic 
overtones Islam has acquired in many societies. Guy Nicolas is one of the few 
scholars who have paid attention to this phenomenon. He introduced the concept 
of the 'ethnicisation of Islam' or the 'ethnic rooting of Islam' (2). Although he 
does not explicitly define this notion, it contains a useful insight: an analytical 
distinction between religious and ethnic identities. The concept refers to the 
identification of an ethnic group with Islam to such a degree that this world 
religion becomes a central ethnic marker vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. This 
overlap of religious and ethnic identities is, however, never complete. 
'Ethnicisation' of Islam is clearly present among the Fulbe of North Cameroon. 
It has become a central ethnic symbol for Fulbe-hood. Ethnic and religious identity 
have become so blurred in practice that Pullo (the singular form of the plural 
Fulbe) and Muslim are often regarded as synonyms in the region. Conversion to 
Islam of members of other ethnic groups in the region has generally been a prelude 
to assimilation into Fulbe society. As a result, the Fulbe have grown from a 
numerically small ethnic group into the largest one of the region over the past two 
centuries. This process of 'Fulbe-isation' has been well described by Schultz for 
the town of Guider in North Cameroon (3). Since the late colonial period, 
however, a new pattern has emerged: religious and ethnic identity changes are no 
longer inextricably interwoven; often, converted people do no longer change their 
ethnic identity, and continue to strongly participate in their ethnic group of origin. 
In this paper I focus on the islamisation of the royal chiefs of one of the 
indigenous ethnic groups in North Cameroon, in order to illustrate ethnic-religious 
developments of this nature. The ethnic group in question is called the Mundang. 
They are one of the many ethnic groups in the area; the Fulbe have generally 
labelled these groups Haabe, 'Pagans', i.e. a category of despised non-Muslims 
who lack any civilization (4). The Mundang partly live in Cameroon and partly on 
the other side of the border in Chad (see map). The northern Mundang, among 
whom I did anthropological field-work in 1988-1990 and 1992, live in the central 
zone of the Kaele Prefecture, in the south-eastern part of the Extreme North 
Province of Cameroon (5). The Cameroonian Mundang are a rather small group 
— they make up less than 1% of the total population of the country. They consider 
themselves to be offshoots from the Chadian Mundang; the latter's homeland, with 
Lere as its capital, is seen as the Mundang heartland. The history of the group 
goes back to at least the middle of the eighteenth century. Politically, their society 
is characterised by a number of kingdoms or chieftaincies into which the 
pre-existing kinship-based clan organization has been integrated (6). 
44 In order to grasp the social significance of the conversions to Islam of several 
Mundang kings, two contextual factors need to be brought into the argument. I 
think the islamising chiefs are caught in between (a) a certain degree of hegemony 
of the Fulbe in the wider society (external power relations), and (b) the demands 
and aspirations of the common Mundang population (internal power relations). My 
hypothesis is that these two factors have limited the chiefs's freedom of 
manoeuvre. Without any doubt my analytic approach is not exhaustive: other 
internal tensions than those between the chiefs and the common population have 
also played a part in the process, e.g. the collective memory of frictions with the 
Fulbe in the 19th century. 
After a description of the historical background and of the process of islamisation 
of the two chiefs involved, I shall first focus upon the external power relations: the 
political career ambitions of the chiefs in the context of the formation of a regional 
power bloc at the eve of independence. Then the internal power relations will be 
dealt with, and I shall complete the article with conclusions concerning the 
cosmological dimension of conversion and ethnicity. 
Historical background 
Islam has managed to spread into the West African savannah societies since about 
the eleventh century AD. The first to convert were generally the kings. The 
growing influence of Muslim scholars and traders at the court centres of the Bam-
bara, Serer, Kotoko, Mandara, Hausa and other states is rather well documented, 
as is the limited impact of this religion at these courts. Many chiefs developed a 
kind of syncretic version of Islam, as they usually continued to be attached to 
pre-Islamic political, juridical and ritual practices of governance which were not 
easily reconcilable with orthodox Islam. To these rulers the Muslim religion was 
a supplementary source of power, as it gave them access to the profitable trade 
circuits which extended into the Arab world at the other side of the Sahara desert 
(7). 
Since the eleventh century AD, Islam has also slowly penetrated into the area that 
is nowadays called North Cameroon. This centuries-old process accelerated in the 
first half of the 19th century, when the Fulbe established a large empire in 
northern Nigeria, which also incorporated the region under investigation. This 
state-building process, born out of a 'holy war' movement, has resulted — after 
the forces of fission had done their work — in a number of Fulbe states, which are 
called lamidates. 
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Diagram 1: The Mundang area in North Cameroon Most autochthonous ethnic groups became more or less subjugated to these states 
in the 19th century. The Fulbe raiders were not only interested in territorial 
expansion, but also, and especially, in making slaves. The northern Mundang have 
probably suffered a great deal because of the regular attacks of the powerful and 
prestigious Fulbe enemies, but they have always succeeded in maintaining a 
considerable degree of autonomy. The Mundang kings, whose spheres of influence 
were usually limited to a relatively small number of nearby villages, were the main 
organizers of opposition. This pattern of violent interaction in the periphery of the 
Fulbe lamidates has hardened the ethnic boundary between Fulbe and Mundang, 
although more peaceful interaction patterns, commercial relations notably, were 
far from absent. The colonial powers — first Germany and then France — have 
consolidated the ethnic gap which had emerged in the 19th century: as from the 
1920s, the Mundang kingdoms were administratively separated from the lamidates 
that had claimed hegemony over them (8). 
The 'ethnicisation of Islam' is very apparent in the Fulbe society of North 
Cameroon. The invasions, conquests and subsequent state formation were 
legitimated by means of Islam, which thus particularised into a state religion and 
political ideology. In this situation Islam has become the main instrument for the 
articulation of ethnic boundaries. Mundang local culture has developed an 
ambiguous attitude towards Islam. On the one hand, it is seen as the religion of 
the conquering ethnic group of the past, and the cornerstone of a superior culture; 
but on the other hand, it is regarded as the religion of a (formerly) aggressive 
enemy, which must be rejected. This Mundang ambivalence exemplifies a central 
feature of the ethnic hierarchy which emerged in the region: a bias toward political 
autonomy, combined with an acceptance of cultural inferiority. The Fulbe used the 
generic term Kaado (pi. Haabe), 'Pagan', to designate the status of potential 
slaves which they accorded to the Mundang and other indigenous groups. 
Conversion to Islam 
Penetration of Islam into local Mundang society is a very recent phenomenon: it 
only started after World War n. This is not to say that islamisation was completely 
absent before, but rather that individual conversions took place in a social context 
of integration into the wider, Fulbe-dominated society. This integration inevitably 
ended up in ethnic identity change: islamised Mundang eventually became Fulbe. 
The first converts who broke this pattern and remained full members of local 
Mundang society, were the chiefs. This conforms to the general pattern, as 
described above, of diffusion of West African Islam: it are usually the chiefs who 
47 are the first to convert. Nowadays all three Mundang chiefs are Muslims. Zuah, 
the chief of Lara, who ruled from 1932 until 1979, was the first chief to convert. 
He had already become interested in Islam in the late 1930s, but it was only in 
1948 that he actually converted, at the age of 42. The present chief of Lara, 
Ahmadu, told me a legend about this conversion of his father. 
Muslims from here [the capital of the Mundang heartland] visited chief Zuah 
in Lera, a village near Lara and the old capital of the kingdom. When they 
withdrew for the prayer ritual, Zuah decided to test their piety. He took an old 
German rifle and loaded it with three cartridges. When he tried to fire in order 
to get them out of their concentration, the weapon refused, no matter how 
much he tried. When the Muslims had finished their prayer, he tried again, and 
this time he succeeded. This miracle convinced him of the power and glory of 
the God of the Muslims, and made him decide to convert. He was the first 
Mundang of Lara to become a Muslim, through the intervention of Mustapha, 
a Muslim scholar, who was sent by the emir of Yola. 
Initially Zuah only adopted the outward appearances of Islam, but after some years 
he became more devout. In 1955 he raised his Muslim status by making the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, so that after his return he could adorn himself with the 
prestigious title of alhadji (Fulfulde; Arab.: hadjdj). In 1966 he made the journey 
to Mecca again. By that time he had already started to use his Muslim name, 
Ahmadu, in public. 
Chief Kakiang of the kingdom of Kaele was the second chief to convert. He 
became a Muslim in 1955, in the year that he was also appointed as chief of 
Kaele, at the age of 25. In the 1940s he had attended a primary school of the 
Lutheran Mission in the area, and had been interested in Christianity for some 
time; he even adopted a self-chosen francophone Christian name. After his 
conversion to Islam he revealed himself more and more as a very strict Muslim, 
and started to call himself Abubakar. In 1966 he became a hadjdj, after having 
accomplished the Mecca pilgrimage. Both chiefs strictly observed the fasting rules 
of the Ramadan month, probably because these tend to function as a major social 
marker of Muslim-hood, and thus as an outward 'sign' of a person's Muslim 
identity. 
Islam presented itself to these Mundang chiefs in its Fulbe version. The ritual 
which accompanied chief Zuah's conversion, for example, was performed by a 
Fulbe Qur'anic scholar, according to the above legend. This is also clear from the 
mosque, which is a Fulbe modelled institution in local society: the architecture of 
the mosque in Kaele town is borrowed from the Fulbe, the sermon is in Fulfulde 
48 (the Fulbe's mother tongue), and the imam claims to be a Pullo being trained in 
religious matters in the Fulbe context. 
As the Islam of the Fulbe has become strongly ethnicised, one would expect that 
islamisation would go together with an adoption of other aspects of the Fulbe 
culture. This has indeed been the case. The two chiefs transgressed the Mundang 
prohibition on ethnic exogamy with the Fulbe, and were thus able to establish a 
Muslim household in their palace. Both married several Fulbe women (besides a 
large number of Mundang women). Zuah's religious zeal was at its height after his 
return from Mecca in 1955: he sent away his many spouses, except for four of 
them (which conforms to the officially admitted maximum number according to 
Islamic law). His devoutness did not last though: after a few years he took back 
most of his former wives as 'concubines'. Chief Kakiang married four Fulbe 
women; they all originate from neighbouring Fulbe villages. 
The chiefs demanded that an intended wife would convert to Islam (if she had not 
done so already) and adopt a Muslim name. In their households — where Islam 
has tended to obscure the members's differences in ethnic backgrounds — Fulbe 
influences have become manifest. This is clear from the names of the members, 
the use of Fulfulde as the major domestic language, and the application of the rule 
of female seclusion. The chiefs also have taken care that their numerous offspring 
would acquire some years of Muslim education. 
Adoption of Fulbe court culture 
The adoption of Fulbe cultural elements has been even more pronounced in the 
political domain. This corroborates the idea that Islam has functioned as a political 
ideology in Fulbe society (9). Both rulers identified with the Fulbe kings 
(laamiibe, sing, laamiido) in North Cameroon and adopted Fulbe regalia. This is 
most manifest in the way they started to present themselves at official occasions 
in a kind of ceremonial procession: the chief would sit on a horse, dressed in the 
Fulbe way, his head protected by a sunshade. He would be preceded by horsemen 
announcing the royal arrival with drums and flutes, and would be followed by his 
notables who were all dressed in boubous. 
Chief Zuah's invitation of a Qur'anic scholar from Yola is an indication that he 
tried to mobilize the old institution of the Yola emirate, that had been the superior, 
Fulbe political authority in North Cameroon in pre-colonial days. This impression 
is further confirmed by Zuah's request to the emir to be officially installed as a 
49 laamiido a few years later, in 1950. The favour was granted, so that he became 
the first indigenous chief in the area who was officially installed as laamiido by 
a Muslim superior ruler (instead of by the colonial power). He thus clearly made 
an attempt to become accepted by the Fulbe aristocracy as a legitimate Muslim 
chief (10). 
Chief Kakiang's identification with the Fulbe rulers of the region has been even 
more pronounced. This is, for example, manifest in a poem composed by his 
orders in the late 1950s. This hymn is a fine illustration of the fact that he not only 
intended to emulate the actual behaviour of the distinguished Fulbe rulers, but also 
tried to conform to the old ideal image of the laamiido as it is present in Fulbe 
cosmology. The song, written in Fulfulde, was collected, translated into French, 
and published by Pierre-Francis Lacroix (11). I quote several lines (my translation; 
line numbers of the original appear between brackets): 
The grand Deputy, our laamiido of Kaele, who commands in 'France' the 
whole of Kaele [9]. 
Father of Prince Ahmadu, I thank you. Prince Ahmadu is also a son of the 
Sultan [13]. 
Prince Buba, worthy of the throne and inseparable of the majesty, the world 
has seen it [16]. 
Buba, Prince of richness, son of the laamiido, the whole world agrees: Buba 
is generous [17]. 
Fadimatu, Lady who has an Arab appearance, Lady of all women: she is pretty 
[20]. 
Lady-companion, the Lady Aïssatu, I saw she looks like an Arab woman [24]. 
I switch to your courtiers, Laamiido, You, Deputy of our world, Distinguished 
One [25]. 
Honoured among the notables, You, the Favoured, Bubakari Garba, who is 
called the Distinguished One [27]. 
Undeniably, he is the treasurer. This treasure, I saw, contains money, not 
textiles [28]. 
Kay gamma, courtier of the laamiido of Kaele, his advice is accurate, and his 
words are well-spoken [30]. 
Beds and mattresses are, as I saw, stitched with gold. In the interior of the 
house it smells of perfume, it is delicious [35]. 
He opened his treasury, I had to turn my head away. The one who hides in 
your shade, does not live in poverty [39]. 
He built a house with a hundred doors; a White man told me so, and this is not 
idle talk [40] 
50 He has a company of soldiers as if it were a feast. They are a thousand, I 
counted them at a meeting [41]. 
Some are guards, others gendarmes; a French military man has become like 
His kaygamma [42]. 
Royal drums made of gold of our laamiido of 'France', You, who, as I 
noticed, is endowed with generosity and political sense [43]. 
Golden house, golden flag, beautiful like gold that shines like a pearl [44]. 
His house has surprised me, I took it for clouds, this house of our grand 
laamiido of Kaele [47]. 
The chief is called a laamiido, and like all laamiibe, he is supposed to be 
extra-ordinary rich: he possesses a treasury filled with money, and a sumptuous 
palace, where gold shines everywhere. This richness is one of the manifestations 
of divine grace, and thus a legitimation of Fulbe royal authority as divinely 
endowed. The Fulfulde word for majesty, laamu, is explicitly applied to one of 
Kakiang's sons, Buba. The princes are referred to with the Fulfulde wordyeriima. 
The chief possesses one of the old regalia of the Fulbe rulers: the flag, which in 
pre-colonial times was given to a new ruler by the emir of Yola as a sign of 
instalment. Kakiang is presented as being wise, just and generous; this is all 
connected to a laamiido's responsibility for the rendering of justice and poor-relief. 
The four central social categories of the Fulbe court are mentioned: the princes, 
the notables, the wives and the servants. Most persons mentioned have Islamic 
names. The Fulbe wives of the chief receive special attention. They are presented 
as Arab women. This association refers (a) to the close bond between Islam and 
the Arab ethnic identity, and (b) to a physical aspect of the ethnic distinction 
between Pullo and Pagan. A light skin is an indication of Fulbe-hood: the lighter 
the skin, the stronger the claim to this identity, as it counts as an outward sign of 
no or rninimal mixing with the indigenous population. The Mundang name for the 
Fulbe, zemay, is related to this: it is associated with the colour bronze. 
The military aspect of the court is not forgotten. The glorification of military 
power — a reminder of the Fulbe state-building in the early 19th century by 
conquer — brings the poet to even include the local police-force into the escort of 
the king to replace the old soldier-slaves. This is of course an inversion of the 
actual reality, as in the late colonial period the military power of the 'traditional' 
chiefs had already been reduced to zero point zero. 
51 Politica] career ambitions 
The Mundang area has only been very marginally linked to the Muslim trade 
circuits in West Africa. Commercial ambitions could thus not have been the reason 
for the chiefly conversions. However, the desire to get access to the outside, 
Fulbe-dominated society was significant in this case too. Both chiefs have tried to 
set themselves up as the official representative and spokesman of the general 
Mundang population. 
Chief Zuah was the first Mundang chief to become interested in national political 
issues. Due to an extension of the electoral suffrage for the Parliament in Yaounde 
two candidates could be recruited from the Kaele subdivision in 1952. Three 
politicians had come from the South in order to create regional voting lists in 
North Cameroon under the banner of French political parties, in order to win local 
votes. The sub-divisional officer recommended that they choose Zuah as their local 
candidate, as the latter had proved to be the most active and loyal chief of the 
area. Zuah did not gain most of the votes — the other chiefs refused to support 
him out of fear that he would develop into a kind of super-chief. He was 
nevertheless chosen as a deputy, as two seats had been reserved for the Kaele 
district. However, he had to give up his parliamentary seat the next year, because 
he was considered not to be sufficiently qualified: he was illiterate and hardly 
spoke any French. A few years later, in 1955, Zuah made another attempt to put 
himself forward as the representative of the Mundang population, by trying to join 
a political initiative of the Fulbe ruler of Maroua, Yaya Dahiru: the Association 
Amicale des Musulmans du Diamaré (see below). He failed again because of the 
opposition of the other chiefs. 
Chief Kakiang's political career is much more of a success-story. In 1956, just one 
year after his appointment as canton chief of Kaele, he was elected into the 
Parliament in Yaounde. His candidature was quite obvious, as at that time he was 
the only chief in the district with the required qualifications: he had attended 
primary school, and had some command of French. He made a lightning career. 
In 1958 he was chosen into the Central Committee (12) at the inaugural meeting 
of the Union Camerounaise (UC), which was to become the ruling party of 
Cameroon. Only in 1992 he had to give up this power position within the party, 
which is presently called Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais 
(RDPC). Until the introduction of a multi-party system in Cameroon in 1991, the 
Central Committee selected the candidates for the parliamentary seats, so that it 
was no problem for Kakiang to be re-elected in the National Assembly of 1960 and 
52 at the subsequent parliamentary elections (until 1988). For many years he was 
known as 'the deputy'. His political heydays were in the second half of the 1950s 
and in the 1960s, when he held special positions within Parliament, and when he 
was selected for several foreign trips (which are coveted prizes within the political 
patronage system). Since the early 1970s, his political influence has dropped: a 
new generation of politicians emerged in Cameroon, and a power struggle in 
Yaounde in the first half of the 1980s resulted in a considerable drop in power of 
politicians from North Cameroon. 
Kakiang became the political representative of the southern part of the Diamare, 
an area that counted about 95.000 people in 1960 and presently about 160.000. He 
was more or less a paramount chief who also represented the other ethnic groups 
in the area: the Giziga, the Tupuri, and even the few pockets of Fulbe. Within the 
Kaele district he was the main organizer and leader of the ruling party for several 
decades. In 1958, half a year after the creation of the Union Camerounaise party, 
a local cell was already created in Kaele town; in subsequent years other branches 
were established in the other chieftaincies of the region. Kakiang was the party 
president at the departmental level until 1982, and he is still one of its most 
prominent members. 
The northern power bloc, or the politicisation of ethnicity 
In order to grasp the relation between the conversions of the Mundang chiefs and 
their political career ambitions, we have to elaborate a little bit on the political 
context, because the decolonization of Cameroon in 1960-61 has had far-reaching 
consequences for the mode of governance of the state, and for the political career 
possibilities that came available. The first head of state of post-colonial Cameroon, 
Ahmadu Ahidjo, who came from the North, proved to be very skilful in handling 
the potential ethnic conflicts in the country. His political style was characterised 
by what might be called a system of ethnic proportionality or — to borrow a 
concept from Rothchild (13) — hegemonical exchange, in which political clien-
talism is the major stabilising factor. In francophone Cameroon it is known as the 
équilibre régional or the équilibre géopolitique. This means that the leaders of the 
many ethnic groups are co-opted by the national state elite: in return for their 
loyalty and cooperation, they receive a share in the resources of the state. The 
arena of exchange is not the Parliament — which was reformed into an institution 
of prebends in the 1960s — but the unitary party. In 1966, the UC became the sole 
recognised political party in the country, after it had absorbed all the rival parties; 
53 this new position was marked by a change of name: UC became UNC (Union 
Nationale Camerounaise). 
Ethnicity was used by the post-colonial state elite for incorporation purposes. The 
existing ethnic groups were politicised: they were transformed into the 
cornerstones of national politics, despite the official rhetoric against tribalism. This 
was largely due to the virtual absence of alternative mobilising forces for political 
group formation, like class. This is not to say of course that post-colonial politics 
in Cameroon is totally ethnicised: other loyalties and conflicts that run across 
ethnic lines do play their part. 
This complex network of patron-client relations encompassed leaders of all ethnic 
groups in the country. For practical purposes these were lumped together to form 
a handful of ethnic regional clusters. Each political bloc is thus a coalition of 
several ethnic groups in one region. Until the early 1980s, central state power was 
dominated by the Beti power bloc and especially the Northerners. After the 
presidential change in 1982 and a failed coup attempt in 1984, the Northern 
politicians lost most of their power. Since then the Beti have taken over most of 
the key positions. President Paul Biya — himself a Bulu, which is an ethnic group 
in the Central South, closely related to the Beti — has been much less successful 
than his predecessor in maintaining a balance of power between the ethnic-regional 
power blocs in the country. The multi-party parliamentary and presidential 
elections of 1992 made clear that the legitimacy of the Biya regime is presently 
seriously at stake, since its support in the north and especially in the west of the 
country turned out to be less than 50%. The president is currently held responsible 
for the economic crisis in the country, as he is accused of having abused his 
powers to disproportionately favour members of his own ethnic group and region. 
Let us now turn to the formation of the Northern power bloc in the late colonial 
period. The Fulbe have been the dominant ethnic group in this bloc. The leaders 
of the North became involved in national politics as a result of the establishment 
of a parliament with advisory powers by the French in the late 1940s. It were, 
however, not the leading laamiibe who came to dominate this bloc, but a new 
generation of young, Western-educated politicians, who generally were not closely 
related to the old Fulbe aristocracy. The rise of this new political elite in Fulbe 
society after the Second World War was not a smooth process. Most resistance 
came from the laamiido of Maroua, Yaya Dahiru. In 1955 he took the initiative 
to unite all Muslim chiefs in the Diamare for a common purpose — the 
establishment of a confederation after the example of the emirates in northern 
Nigeria, in order to safeguard a considerable degree of regional autonomy for the 
North in the approaching post-colonial state of Cameroon. This failed, and in 1959 
54 he was even forced to resign. Chief Zuah of Lara had evidently backed the wrong 
horse (or bull). 
The Northern power bloc has been dominated by the Fulbe. This is, for example, 
evident in the official emblem of the UC party: a bull, which refers to the nomadic 
past of the Fulbe. However, the indigenous ethnic groups were not completely 
excluded from political power. The chiefs of these groups were integrated into the 
U(N)C parry, which has had a virtual monopoly in the North since its 
establishment in 1958. In the Kaele area it was the chief of Kaele who became the 
party leader, whereas the other local chiefs were co-opted as presidents of the local 
party branches. They were rewarded with all kinds of favours and prerogatives, 
such as high salaries, government-sponsored cars, parliamentary seats, and a 
considerable freedom of political manoeuvre in the rural parts of their cantons. 
The political relevance of the autochthonous ethnic groups in North Cameroon was 
thus explicitly recognised by the post-colonial regime. President Ahidjo probably 
realised that he could not consolidate his power in the North without the inclusion 
of the non-Fulbe ethnic groups into the political system. The power relations had 
gradually changed during the colonial period, due to several causes. The numerical 
dominance of the non-Fulbe groups had increased as a result of the relatively low 
fertility rates among the Fulbe. The same holds true for their political and 
economic impact. After World War II ethnic groups like the Mundang had taken 
advantage of the new opportunities which had come available in the form of cash 
crop production, Christianity, education, and general suffrage. The new Fulbe 
politicians were aware that these indigenous groups were no longer the 
marginalised Pagans that most Fulbe still held them to be. 
Within the power bloc the dominant group, the Fulbe, has exerted cultural 
hegemony over the others. The royal elites of the incorporated groups have been 
55 forced to accommodate the Fulbe in the fields of language, religion, and political 
authority. The Fulbe have imposed not so much their name upon the new power 
bloc — it has a regional label — but rather their language, their religion, and their 
political culture. French is the official state language in North Cameroon, but it 
is Fulfulde which prevails in the informal political circuits; Zuah and Kakiang did 
not have any language communication problem, as both had a command of Fulful-
de. The cultural interaction problem between the autochthonous chiefs and the 
Fulbe leaders was solved by a hegemonic demand of conversion to Islam and 
adoption of Fulbe royal symbolism: only non-Fulbe chiefs who were willing to 
adopt this religion, and to adopt the outward characteristics of 'traditional' Fulbe 
authority, were acceptable as political partners to the Fulbe elites. The effect was 
that political power in North Cameroon came to be effectively monopolised during 
the 1960s and 1970s by Fulfulde speaking Muslims, be they Fulbe or not. 
The two Mundang chiefs have given in to these hegemonic demands: they have 
displayed a very direct type of reference group behaviour. A co-opted chief like 
Zuah tried to enhance his power and prestige, and to become a leading politician 
in the Northern power bloc. Unfortunately for him, the Fulbe rulers in the Dia-
mare generally refused to acknowledge Zuah as a 100% Muslim chief — they saw 
him as a 'Pagan Muslim', as a Muslim of dubious reputation who had not yet 
completely shed his Pagan past — notwithstanding his official instalment as a 
laamiido by the emir of Yola. 
Chief Kakiang has been more successful, as he managed to become one of the 
leading politicians of the Northern power bloc. His frantic efforts to give his 
Mundang kingship a new authority that was acceptable to the Fulbe elites in the 
North should be seen in this light. In the regional prestige system of royal 
authority, Fulbe 'traditional' leadership was used as the standard of prestige, and 
Kakiang wished to rise on this prestige scale by means of mimetic behaviour. But 
he too has never managed to completely distance himself from his former Pagan 
identity. The above mentioned poem contains several clues to his ambivalent status 
in Fulbe circles. 
First, Kakiang could not find a first-class Fulbe poet to make the hymn. It was not 
written by one of the outstanding poets of this kind of literature, who are without 
exception of Fulbe aristocratic origins. The ethnic identity of the writer, Buuba 
Malum Jariida, was rather ambivalent, as he was the son of a Bornu man and a 
Hausa woman. In Fulbe literate circles he was considered as a second-rate poet, 
somewhere in between the most prestigious poets and the griots (14). 
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Islamic instruction, and he was not affiliated to a Muslim brotherhood. Therefore 
it is no surprise that the essential role of a laamiido as the moral guide and 
protector of the local Muslim community that God has dedicated to him, is hardly 
mentioned in the song. 
Thirdly, the poem keeps silent about the descent of Kakiang, which contradicts to 
the Fulbe custom to make much of royal genealogies, as they 'show' that 
sovereignty is bestowed upon the ruling dynasty by God. Any references to the 
origins and Mundang identity of the chief of Kaele would of course reveal his 
non-Muslim and non-Fulbe background, and thus defeat the purpose of the poem. 
However, the song clearly shows the composer's conviction that a canton chief like 
Kakiang is largely a colonial creation. Kakiang is, for instance, called the 'White 
man of Kaele in "France" '. 
The ambivalent status of the two chiefs among Fulbe aristocratic circles is also 
clear from the fact that they did not succeed to marry a daughter of a Fulbe laami-
ido or high court notable. At the Fulbe courts the rule of ethnic endogamy was 
strictly observed: Zuah and Kakiang were not considered suitable sons-in-law, and 
had to agree to marrying daughters of Fulbe commoners. 
The Mundang chiefs's responsiveness to the wider political conjuncture is also 
illustrated by the fact that the Fulbe variant of Islam, as well as Fulbe power 
symbolism, have gradually faded into the background in the public image making 
of the chiefs of Lara and Kaele, after the dominance of the Northern power bloc 
on the national and provincial levels had considerably diminished in the first half 
of the 1980s. I mention just a few examples. Chief Kakiang has abandoned his 
earlier habit to dress like a 'traditional' Fulbe ruler, with the face almost 
completely covered. He has recently given ethnic (i.e. Mundang) names to several 
of his younger sons who had only received a Muslim name at their birth, in 
connection with their participation in the local initiation ceremony (/canne). The 
present chief of Lara, Ahmadu (1979 - ) is less strict a Muslim than his father 
was: he publicly consumes alcohol, and does not obstruct the performance of the 
ancestral masques in any way. It seems that both chiefs are more and more in 
favour of a tolerant kind of Islam. This renewed interest in Mundang local culture 
has to do with the political weakening of the Fulbe after the failed putsch in 1984: 
since then Muslim hegemony has completely disappeared in the context of the 
ruling party. This has become very manifest at the multi-party elections in 1992: 
most Muslims in North Cameroon voted for the opposing UNDP (Union Nationale 
pour la Démocratie et le Progrès), whereas the majority of the non-Muslim 
population as well as Muslim chiefs like chief Kakiang voted for the ruling RDPC 
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to the RDPC). 
The two rulers illustrate the emergence of a new intermediate status category that 
does not fit the familiar dichotomy between Pullo and Pagan. These islamised 
non-Fulbe are called juulbe in Fulfulde, which simply means 'those who pray'. 
As we have seen, the prevailing Fulbe attitude toward these chiefs has been 
somewhere in between acceptance and non-acceptance. This ambivalence was 
brought about by the fact that their change of religious identity did not go together 
with an ethnic identity change; their Mundang-hood has never been at stake. As 
the representative of his ethnic group, chief Kakiang could not cross the ethnic 
boundary and pass into Fulbe-hood. Would he have done so, he would have lost 
his political legitimacy as the spokesman for 'his people' , and thus become unfit 
to represent them. 
Diffusion of Islam 
In the above we have seen that the two Mundang chiefs had to take account of the 
demands of their Fulbe patrons in the ruling party in order to start off a modern 
political career. This has resulted in a blurring of the differences between the 
Mundang chief doms and the Fulbe lamidates. One would expect that this 
accommodation to the wider Fulbe polity would cause frictions between the chiefs 
and the leaders of the clans in local society, as these elders have a strong foothold 
in chiefs's affairs. The remarkable thing is that they have hardly voiced any 
protests. Some tension arose, which however did not escalate into an open conflict. 
Let us look at the reactions of the common people with regard to chiefly efforts 
to encourage conversion to Islam (15). In this field one would expect conflicts to 
arise. Kakiang's and Zuah's attachment to their Fulbe patrons in the U(N)C party 
is clear from their holier-than-thou attitude with regard to Islam. However, 
islamisation is quite a step, as Islam has been a central ethnic boundary marker, 
which has separated the Mundang from the Fulbe for more than a century and a 
half. Many Mundang still regard Islam as the religion of the old enemy, and 
remain averse. 
Chief Zuah tried to promote Islam in the 1950s according to a well-tried Islamic 
conversion strategy: he invited Qur'anic scholars to come preaching and teaching, 
and distributed 'rosaries decorated with illustrations of Mecca' to the heads of 
58 villages and wards under his jurisdiction (16). His attempts remained largely in 
vain. 
The chief of Kaele exerted some pressure upon people to adopt Islam in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but again only within the limits of his personal network of clients, i.e. 
members of his palace, courtiers, and village and ward heads. His wives and 
children and the palace servants converted, but only a minority of the court 
notables gave in. His success in convincing his notables in the chiefdom 
administration can be deducted from the following table, which shows the growing 
percentage of Muslim ward heads over the years in the urban centre of Kakiang's 
chiefdom, the township of Kaele. 
1960  1972  1982  1990 
Local religion  79  56  30  21 
Christianity  7  4  15  21 
Islam  7  36  52  58 
Table 1. Religious identity of ward heads in Kaele town in different years (in %) 
(17) 
These percentages are not typical for the canton as a whole. Islamic influence 
remained largely limited to this township. This urban focus is in line with the 
general pattern of diffusion of Islam in North Cameroon (and West Africa as a 
whole). Islam was especially promoted in the domain of urban public symbols. In 
order to grant the town a Muslim image, Islamic — i.e. Fulbe or Hausa — names 
were given to newly created wards. The influence of Islam is also manifest in the 
prohibition to sell alcohol and pork at the weekly market, which came into force 
in the 1960s. Chief Kakiang also ordered at his costs the construction of a nice 
mosque along the town's main entrance road. Furthermore, he appointed an imam, 
and a Muslim judge (Arab, qadhi, Fulfulde: alkali); he surrounded himself with 
a group of Qur'anic teachers as general advisers in Muslim-related issues. 
Moreover, he stimulated the establishment of Qur'anic schools in his canton; 
around 1980, there were about twenty of these schools in Kaele town alone) (18). 
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rural chiefs and male elders without any party-career ambitions were usually left 
alone as far as their religious affiliation was concerned. A formal adherence to the 
party was considered to be enough. The majority of the common people was 
hardly affected by the new political developments nor involved in the resource 
distribution taking place within the party patronage system. They opposed 
conversion, as it was not in their interest. Furthermore, a general dislike of Islam 
as the religion of the Fulbe was still so widespread among the people that Zuah 
and Kakiang did not start using their Muslim names in public until well into the 
1960s. 
In the first half of the 1970s the pressure upon the local population to convert 
increased considerably. Many village heads converted and with each of them 
dozens of villagers. In the bigger villages small Muslim communities sprang up. 
However, it were not the chiefs who were the prime initiators of this pressure, but 
the Muslim sub-prefect at the time. This official invited Qur'anic scholars from 
Fulbe regions to come over and preach; he pressed local chiefs to convert (if they 
had not done so already), and to convince their followers to do the same. The 
chief of Kaele supported him in this effort by accompanying him during his 
promotion tours in the area, at which occasion the sub-prefect distributed money 
and clothes to the village and ward heads. Kakiang advised the people to embrace 
Islam at his public speeches, but he did not force them. In the years 1973-1975 the 
third Mundang chief (the one of Boboyo), the two Giziga chiefs (of Midjivin and 
Moutouroua), and one of the four Tupuri chiefs in the Kaele district converted to 
Islam. These conversions produced a wave of islamisation within the networks of 
personal clients of these chiefs. For example, two months after the conversion of 
its chiefs, 570 people in the village of Midjivin and 168 in the village of Boboyo 
embraced Islam (19). 
After 1975 the pressure dissipated. The results were rather meagre. Islam had 
penetrated into the networks of personal dependence relations of the chiefdom 
structure, but only to a limited extent. The township of Kaele, where the progress 
of Islam was most notable, can serve again as an example. Table 1 shows that 
almost half of the ward heads were able to withstand the pressure to convert to 
Islam, and some even converted to Christianity. Even within the immediate family 
circles of the chiefs not everybody converted to Islam: only three of the seven 
brothers of Kakiang have become Muslims, and a junior brother of chief Zuah of 
Lara even became an active promoter of Christianity as a catechist. 
The common population was hardly touched by Islam. The Christian missions 
proved to be much more effective in making converts among young men and 
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regional administration and the chiefs. In Lara, for example, the Catholic Mission 
was the dominant social force in the 1970s. This was admitted in an administrative 
report written by the Muslim sub-prefect of the time, as the following quotation 
shows (in my translation) (20): 
'The situation of Lara needs to be re-examined. This locality has completely 
come under the influence of private initiative. The presence of the Catholic 
mission since more than 20years, and its social investments (a primary school 
with a complete range of classes, and a dispensary) have caused the local 
people to depend in practice much more on this church than on the state. ' 
The situation in Kaele town is also illustrative: most recently islamised ward heads 
commanded a predominantly non-Muslim population that was in a process of 
becoming Christian. In 1972 this was true for 56% of the Muslim ward heads, and 
in 1982 of even 71%. Furthermore, the few conversions that actually took place, 
were largely nominal. Most converts remained integrated in the clan structure of 
the ethnic group, continued to actively participate in the cults of the land and of 
the ancestors, and continued to consume millet beer and pork. 
The social significance of islamisation was not so much that of a religious identity 
change of the people concerned, but a conformist attitude towards the dominant 
political ideology of the time, which happened to be Islam. This is also clear from 
the public speeches of chief Kakiang, in which he gave the impression that a 
conversion would be an act of loyalty to president Ahidjo. The easily performed 
Islamic conversion ritual should thus not be seen as an indicator of religious 
identity change, but rather as an expression of political conformity. Given the 
political nature of conversion, it is no surprise that the popularity of Islam has 
dwindled after the political change of power in Cameroon after the failed coup in 
1984. Since Muslim hegemony over the regional state-party apparatus has come 
to an end, a wave of de-islamisation has taken place in the Kaele region. In most 
Mundang villages there are hardly any Muslims any more (21). 
The conversion pattern in local Mundang society shows that Zuah and Kakiang 
have hardly managed to spread Islam among the populations they ruled, despite the 
support from regional administrators for some time. The pattern of islamisation 
neatly corresponds to a structural feature of Mundang society: a distinction 
between the kingdom and clan levels. The limited appeal of Islam can only be 
understood if we take account of this distinction. 
61 The king versus the elders 
The chiefdom and clan levels are two distinct domains of male power, which 
cannot be reduced to each other (22). I will present a simplified sketch of this dual 
structure, by making use of Alfred Adler's analyses of the dominant cosmology 
of the pre-colonial Mundang chiefdom of Lere in Chad (23). The simplification 
consists in the fact that I take the differences in organization and ritual between the 
Mundang of Lere and the northern Mundang to be negligible. This is a sound 
procedure, because the local political culture in the Kaele region has been largely 
modelled on the Lere kingdom, so that differences only exist in details. 
The clans are gerontocratically structured, although not to such an absolute extent 
as the dominant male ideology wants us to believe. An elite of male clan elders 
monopolizes most positions of power and authority. The clans are patrilineal, and 
their members live scattered over several villages. They are linked to each other 
by ties of marriage — each clan is exogamous — and until well into this century 
by blood feud. The elders of the autochthonous clan pockets in a locality are the 
guardians of a land cult (which takes care of the ritual aspects of the use of land 
lest it loses its fertility), and an ancestral cult (which is the institutional setting for 
the male initiation ceremony and for the funeral ceremonies of high-ranking 
elders). 
The clan pockets of one or several villages are integrated into the chiefdom 
structure. In terms of its mode of production, its territorial organization, and its 
ritual domain, the kingdom represents a distinct structural domain complementary 
to that of the clans. The various cosmological mechanisms through which the two 
domains are integrated in Mundang society manifest the power of the clan elders 
with regard to the king: 
Firstly, the clan elders are the kingmakers. This small elite forms a powerful 
council of advisers, that is responsible for the most secret royal rites of passage, 
i.e. the king's coronation and his funeral. During an interregnum — which in 
principle would last about a year — this council would replace the king. At the 
yearly harvest festival the authority of the elders as kingmakers is still expressed 
and reaffirmed. 
Secondly, the clan elders are the 'bride-givers' to the chief, if one can say so, and 
as such they exert an authority as fathers-in-law. Contrary to marriages in the clan 
domain, the chief marries women without any compensation to the families. There 
is a local proverb that says: 'marrying a woman is like buying a camel' (pa bang 
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parents-in-law can never be completely discharged. Hence, the king is in a 
never-ending debt relation to the category of clan elders as a whole. 
Thirdly, the elders of the autochthonous clans are the 'owners of the land'. They 
are the guardians of the land cult, whereas the chief is mythically presented as a 
stranger, who has been invited to come and rule. This cosmological opposition 
between autochthonous versus allochthonous is brought out in social life in the 
form of an avoidance relation between the king and the ritual leader of the land 
cult, thepasyingri (litt. 'master of the spirits'), who represents a lethal force to 
the former. This type of gerontocratie authority is symbolised by secret regalia. 
These represent the (re)productive potential of the land and ultimately belong to 
the local clans pockets. The regalia are periodically 'purified' by the most impor-
tant 'master of the land' ipaseri, orpiliang as he is called in the Kaele region). 
It is the first wife of the king who stores them in her house. 
Fourthly, several clans elders claim complementary authority, due to a particular 
role within the kingdom cosmology. The chief of Kaele, for example, stands in a 
perpetual kinship relation to the Toonri clan, whose elders he has to respect as his 
senior brothers. Furthermore, the Tekabbe clan elders are responsible for all royal 
blood sacrifices, and the Lah Tegeere clan elders function as the 'medicine men' 
of the chief. 
The king depends on these gifts in order to rule legitimately. He needs a territory 
with subjects who respect his jurisdiction; he needs a multitude of wives, to grant 
him children and to produce the material richness required for periodic sacrifices 
and ceremonial redistributions; he needs the secret regalia to meet his most 
important responsibility, to make rain; and he needs 'medicines' to remain 
healthy; and sacrificial specialists to meet his ritual obligations. The royal 'work' 
— in practice it is realised by an extreme passivity, an abstention of any productive 
task — is essentially sacrificial in nature. The chief is not activity involved in 
sacrificial blood shedding: he delivers the animals to be slaughtered, but the actual 
killing in Kaele is done by a Tekabbe clan elder, who exposes himself, by doing 
so, to the lethal force of the regalia. However, in essence it is the chief himself 
who is the sacrifice. This secret points to the presence of a notion of ritual regicide 
in the Mundang cosmology. This 'work' goes together with a number of 
prohibitions: a chief should neither eat or drink, nor touch the earth, carry out 
physical work, and least of all die — at least not in public. 
The interdependence between the chief and the clans is periodically celebrated in 
the rituals of the royal cult, in the form of sacrificial meals at the harvest festival 
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prosperity and social order. The dish consists of millet (which represents the clan 
level) and meat (which represents the kingdom level). It is produced by members 
of the royal compound, and the whole village population is invited to participate 
in this ritual consumption. 
Many elements of this cosmology are still discernible in the present politico-ritual 
system of the chiefdoms of Kaele and Lara. However, the system as such is no 
longer fully operational, due to the impact of colonial rule. In the 1920s the 
French administration imposed a political reform of the Mundang kingdoms. 
Several of them were put together to form a small number of cantons. The 
introduction of several features of the Fulbe lamidates by French colonial officers 
considerably enhanced the power of the Mundang kings. The council of clan elders 
was transformed into an advisory institute whose members were partly appointed 
by the chief. It was henceforth calledfaada, which means 'court' in Fulfulde. The 
'war chief {jcaygamma) became the official replacement of the chief during an 
interregnum (which was considerably shortened in the process). A territorial 
hierarchy of village and ward heads, nominated by the chief, was imposed upon 
the clan structure. Finally, the chief's rights to distribute land increased 
considerably, at the expense of the leaders of the land cult. Since then, the 
authority of the clan elders as kingmakers and 'owners of the land' has seriously 
declined, and the performance of public rituals has steadily eroded. However, the 
power and authority of the elders are still considerable, as we shall see. 
Ritual duties of the king 
Islamisation neatly reflects the dualistic nature of local Mundang society: it has 
remained restricted to the chiefdom level, and has hardly trickled down to the clan 
level. Given this situation, one would expect some tension to arise between the 
Muslim chief and the clan elders at the ritual ceremonies. However, the two 
Muslim chiefs have generally managed to reconcile their efforts to be 'good 
Muslims' with their Pagan responsibilities of a ritual and redistributive nature. 
The Muslim chiefs have continued offering food and clothing to the clan elders 
who are members of the advisory council, as well as offering food to all 
inhabitants at the yearly festivals. The islamisation of the royal compound caused 
a serious problem though. According to the new norms the women were no longer 
allowed to engage in several productive activities: the work on the fields and the 
preparation of millet beer. The chief's spouses lost their fields, were no longer 
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(although it was accepted in the evening twilight when one is less conspicuous). 
A twofold solution was found for this loss of female working power. Part of the 
female tasks were contracted out to non-Muslim women from outside the palace; 
and the chiefs managed to extract more forced labour on their fields from the 
population, due to their increased power over land tenure issues. 
As we have seen the role of the chief in ritual matters is largely a passive one, 
since the actual sacrificing is done by a ritual specialist of one of the clans. As far 
as I know, the chief of Kaele has never refused to provide cattle for sacrificial 
purposes. The king's rain-making responsibilities and the masquerade of the 
ancestor cult are hemmed in secrecy, and thus do not openly contradict with the 
chief's public image of a strict Muslim. It is easy for him to dissimulate his 
involvement in these 'traditional issues', for example by emphasising that these are 
not the business of outsiders (like myself) (24). His Muslim identity proves to be 
situational: it is stressed in the interaction patterns with the wider society, and far 
less relevant in the intra-local interaction patterns between king and commoners. 
The shroud of secrecy which is woven around several facets of local religion to 
outsiders, is very functional in this respect. 
Only in those rare cases where the chief's active and public ritual participation was 
required, some tension arose. In the mid-1960s chief Kakiang had problems with 
a purificatory libation ritual during the zah beleere ceremony, which is part of the 
land cult and is presided over by the above-mentioned piliang (25). He refused to 
be poured over with a mixture of white millet flower and water (sumbii) at some 
point in the ritual process. This brought him into conflict with the elite of clan 
elders in the kingdom: they threatened him to withdraw the war drum {damme) 
from his palace as a token that they would no longer accept him as their king. The 
conflict was, however, settled without escalation. It was decided that the elders 
would no longer insist on the libation of the king, whereas Kakiang promised to 
be present at the ceremony, and to refrain from sabotaging the performance of 
rituals and festivals. 
The power of the king to obstruct ritual performances is considerable: it is the king 
who is responsible — after an obligatory consultation of several diviners using 
stones (pakendang) — for fixing and announcing the dates of the yearly festivals; 
and he guards the funeral drum (yung wuli), without which no ritual of the 
ancestor cult can be held. Chief Zuah of Lara has tried to minimise the 
performance of the ancestral masques at the festivals and at the funeral dances, and 
their roaming about in the chiefly village of Lara during the last month of the 
Mundang year cycle (fing deblii), but he has never imposed a general prohibition. 
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My hypothesis that the chiefs would encounter a considerable amount of resistance 
from the side of the clan elders as soon as the former would adapt themselves to 
the Fulbe-dominated outside world, is not confirmed. The two chiefs developed 
into rather orthodox Muslims in the first two decades after independence, by 
contrast to the syncretic tendencies in the beliefs and practices which have 
developed in many pre-colonial states in West Africa. The clan elders largely 
remained silent, as we have seen. 
Two explanations, one exogenous and the other endogenous, are suggested by the 
data which have been presented in my argument. Firstly, the process of state 
incorporation that accelerated strongly in the first half of this century, is relevant 
in this respect. The chiefs could distance themselves somewhat from the sacred and 
ritual facets of their authority, due to the considerable change in the nature of 
chiefly authority during the colonial period. The increase in administrative and 
political tasks of the kings (in their role of canton chiefs) meant that the 
legitimation of chiefly authority started to rely more upon the relation of the chiefs 
with the colonial state than upon their relation with the population. The chiefs's 
increasing dependence on regional administrators explains their growing concern 
to be accepted as legitimate authorities by these bureaucrats. We have seen that the 
chiefs's new tasks and responsibilities, imposed by the Europeans, were partly 
modelled on the pre-colonial power structure of the Fulbe lamidates. In North 
Cameroon in the 1960s and 1970s, the post-colonial state came to be dominated 
by Muslims, and therefore it is quite logical that several Mundang chiefs converted 
to Islam, and emphasised a kind of Fulbe laamiido image in their official 
presentation at, for example, the parades at the national Cameroon feast days. 
After the Muslim dominance faded away, they have done much less so. This 
historical variability, corresponding to state developments at the regional and 
national level, is an indication that the contemporary power position of the Mun-
dang chiefs depends much more on their legitimation with regard to the regional 
state elite than on their popular authority, which is anchored in local Mundang 
cosmology. 
This old cosmology, institutionalised in a court cult, a land cult, and an ancestral 
cult, has eroded over the past 50 years. This is due to the growing impact of 
Christianity, and of cotton and dry season millet (muskwari) cultivation. 
Christianised Mundang tend to withdraw from the chiefly public rituals in so far 
as these are regarded to be incompatible with the doctrines of this world religion, 
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weakened considerably, and consequently the impact of the leaders of the land 
cult, because the growth cycle of the new crops does not match with the Mundang 
ritual calendar. As a result, the clan elders have lost much of their power and 
influence over the king. This partly explains why these representatives of the 
population could not prevent Zuah and Kakiang from converting to Islam, although 
they probably would have wanted to, given the anti-Fulbe sentiments that were 
prevailing in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The loss of power of the clan elders, however, only partly explains why they have 
not voiced any serious protests. I think an endogenous explanation, paying 
attention to local cosmology, might provide the rest of the answer. 
In the foregoing I have stressed that the active ritual involvement of the chiefs in 
the major rituals has been so limited and/or secret that it has been easily 
reconcilable with a public Muslim identity. What is more important, however, is 
that the clan elders have never really objected to the islamisation of the kings, to 
their adoption of a 'modern' religious identity which has significance in the wider 
world, as long as the kings would fulfil their ritual and redistributive 
responsibilities. Personal convictions and doctrine issues are of no relevance in this 
matter. Evidently, the extrovert, accommodating behaviour of the chiefs has been 
quite legitimate in the eyes of the common population. This points to a functional 
division in local society. The king is outside the clan structure, and thus not 
hampered by the rigorous norms which guide the interaction between kinsmen. 
This is in line with the cosmological image of the king as an invited stranger, who 
has come from elsewhere. Therefore, he has considerable freedom of manoeuvre 
to adapt himself to the exigencies of the outer world. 
The kingdom structure finds its ultimate legitimation in local cosmology in a 
twofold process: an appropriation, and subsequent transformation of potentially 
negative outside forces (which threaten to destroy the clan structure) into positive 
ones, which guarantee the survival of the clan order in an ever-changing world. 
The regalia symbolize this process. In short, the chiefdom's raison d'être is to deal 
with the outside world, protect the clans from its negative influences, or, if 
possible, turn them into positive ones. Thus, the Mundang kingdom has functioned 
as a 'cultural brokerage-mechanism', as a progressive mechanism for the 
incorporation of outside cultural traits, derived from other ethnic groups. This 
process-like feature is anchored in the old cosmology of the Mundang, which is 
intimately linked to the annual cycle of millet agriculture. The Mundang chiefs 
have a female-like, inclusive aspect, which is most clear in their rain-making 
quality. They are not believed to generate rain, but to see to it that it falls at the 
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from far away. The chiefs are held responsible for a transformation: it is their task 
to turn the potentially harmful force that rain is, into a beneficial one. They see 
to it that it fecundates the land — which is the domain of the clans — so that the 
millet seeds can come alive and produce a good harvest. 
This feature is the 'motor' behind the political behaviour of the Mundang rulers. 
The Fulbe have been the major outside threat to the Mundang since the early 19th 
century. The Mundang polities have a history of accommodation to these powerful 
enemies: the kings have adopted many outward characteristics of the Fulbe status 
system in order to become acceptable as brokers to the Fulbe overlords, and in the 
late 19th century they had even started to imitate the superior warfare system of 
the Fulbe, which was based on a cavalry. At that time this selective 
accommodation was part of a defensive strategy vis-à-vis the Fulbe. The European 
colonial power subscribed to the existing prestige system of authority, at the top 
of which figured the laamiibe, and introduced several elements of the Fulbe lamid-
ates into the Mundang chieftaincies. Therefore, the Mundang chiefs continued to 
regard these Fulbe rulers as the prime reference figures after they had submitted 
to the superior power of the Europeans. This outward orientation and 
cameleon-like character of the Mundang kingdom is not a deviation from its 'tradi-
tional' function, but the very essence of it. By adopting Islam and other Fulbe 
characteristics, the chiefs just did what they were legitimately supposed to do. The 
kingdom is a kind of 'window', so that it is no surprise that it is especially at this 
level that we find a blurring of ethnic boundaries. The mimetic behaviour is 
legitimate, as long as it functions as a buffer to maintain the relative autonomy of 
the introvert clan structure of Mundang society. 
This interpretation provides an answer as to why this adaptive behaviour did not 
cause more resentment among the population than it actually did. Problems only 
arose when the king threatened to distance himself from his ritual duties, thus 
endangering the cosmological framework of the kingdom-clan interaction pattern. 
The chief's participation in the rituals is a guarantee that the extrovert behaviour 
of the chiefs is ultimately transformed into the well-being of the Mundang 
population as a whole. 
This faculty of the Mundang kingdom to incorporate outside influences as a 
mechanism of adaptation does not seem to constitute a general characteristic of 
African states. If a Mundang peculiarity, it might provide part of the answer to a 
remarkable contradiction: Mundang society have generally proved to be very 
responsive to outside influences, while at the same time its members have 
preserved a rather strong sense of ethnic identity. 
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level. The conversion to Islam of Zuah and Kakiang is related to the emergence 
of a Northern power bloc, since this regional identity has become closely 
associated with Islam. This world religion has emerged as the prime ethnic marker 
of a Northern identity: the opposition between Northerners and Southerners has 
primarily been perceived as a difference between Islam and Christianity/Paganism. 
In that sense it would be more accurate to speak of a 'régionalisation' of Islam 
instead of an 'ethnicisation'. Since independence, tribalism and regionalism have 
been officially discouraged. However, both phenomena have received powerful 
reinforcement through de facto practices of governance: like in the colonial period, 
state resources and nominations continued to be allocated largely along ethnic and 
regional lines. The emergence of the Northern power bloc should be seen in this 
context. 
The remarkable thing to note is that this trend toward religious homogeneity has 
gone hand in hand with a maintenance of the pre-existing ethnic heterogeneity. The 
ethnic identity of autochthonous ethnic groups like the Mundang has been explicitly 
recognised by the post-colonial regime. They were not suppressed but rather 
included in the new political order of the one-party state. 
It was only then that Islam could begin to penetrate the non-Fulbe societies of 
North Cameroon, instead of merely detaching individual members from the clan 
domain and incorporating them into Fulbe society. In other words, in the context 
of the post-colonial state, islamisation is no longer so inextricably associated with 
ethnic identity change, with assimilation to the Fulbe, as it was in the pre-colonial 
and colonial days. 
Although Islam in North Cameroon is still heavily coloured by Fulbe culture, a 
new development has set in which tends to transform it into a poly-ethnic religion 
in this region. Islam has started to dissociate itself from one ethnic group, and 
gradually gives rise to a poly-ethnic community. This is evidenced by the 
emergence of a new category of believers, the non-Fulbe Muslims, which are 
called juulbe. Indigenous chiefs like Zuah and Kakiang have been the trend-setters. 
At first sight the adaptive behaviour of the Mundang chiefs seems to underscore 
the Pullo-Pagan distinction, as it presupposes an acknowledgement of the cultural 
superiority of the Fulbe; in the short run this is true. But in the long run this 
behaviour undermines this ethnic distinction, because it is an expression of the 
actual and desired trend toward more egalitarian ethnic relations in the area. It is 
yet to early to determine what kind of religious changes will eventually result, but 
I guess that the trend toward 'ethnicisation' which existed so strongly until 
recently, will rapidly subside. 
69 Notes 
1. Cohen 1969. 
2. See Nicolas, 1978: 347-377; and 1981: 170-180. 
3. Schultz 1979, 1980, 1984. 
4. 'Pagan' is not a neutral (and then dubious) sociological category, but an implied 
complementary religious category in both Islam and Christianity, referring to those elements of 
the local religions that must be deemed incompatible with these world religions, i.e. the cult of 
ancestors and spirits other than the Supreme Being (Peel, 1978: 448). Therefore I retain the term 
'Pagan' throughout my argument as a rendering of an aspect of the participants's religious 
outlook. In North Cameroon, the link between Islam and cultural superiority is based on literacy: 
an old stereotype goes that Muslims can read and write, whereas Pagans cannot. 
5. My research in North Cameroon has been financed by the African Studies Centre in Leiden 
(Netherlands). I like to thank Wim van Binsbergen, Peter Geschiere, José van Santen, and Rob 
Buijtenhuijs for their useful comments on an earlier version of this article. 
6. This topic has been extensively studied by the French ethnographer Alfred Adler for the 
Mundang kingdom of Lere. See notably Adler 1969, 1978, 1981, 1982, 1987. 
7. This general pattern is described in two articles in a recent study on ethnicity, for example: 
Dévisse 1989 and Rouanda 1989; see also Nicolas 1981: 54-63. 
8. The pronounced ethnic-religious dichotomy between the Fulbe and the indigenous ethnic 
groups in the region, which goes back to the last century, can still be found in many recent 
academic studies on North Cameroon society. The finest example is Boutrais et al. 1984. 
9. See e.g. Blanckmeister & Heine 1983. This is not to say that Islam is completely politicised 
in North Cameroon. On the contrary, religious beliefs and practices of the common Muslim 
population in the region are remarkably little imbued with political matters (compared to 
northern Nigeria). 
10. See Zoua 1982: 67. 
11. Lacroix 1965: 168-177. 
12. Until 1975 this supreme body of the party was called the Political Bureau. 
13. See Rothchild 1986: 72. 
14. Lacroix 1965: 30-31. 
15. See also Schilder 1991. 
16. Source: Mazarguil 1955. 
17. Source: standardised interviews with all 26 ward heads in Kaele town in 1990. 
18. Zoua 1982: 61. 
19. Zoua 1982: 74-76. 
20. Source: Sadou 1977: 8. 
21. Unfortunately, I do not have information about conversion trends among the female half of 
the Mundang population. I have the impression that conversion to Islam was primarily a male 
affair, because of its political nature. The men maintain that women's behaviour in matters of 
religious change conform to the dominant norm that 'a woman should follow her husband'. It 
should not be excluded that women follow their own conversion strategies, although the virtual 
absence of religiously heterogeneous households does not corroborate this hypothesis. 
22. These are not the only power domains in contemporary Mundang society. Other ones are, 
for instance, the local market, the body of governmental services, and the more 'hidden' 
exercise of power by women. 
70 23. See note 6. 
24. I must say that I sympathize with this viewpoint. The Western-scientific 'need' to unmask 
ritual secrets can be very destructive in the African context: secrecy and its associated rumours 
are essential for the ritual efficacy. Everybody talks about the secret things, but few know the 
ins and outs of the matter, and those who do keep silent. It is quite probable that as soon as 
these rituals are stripped of their secrecy something very trivial remains, which lacks any 
cultural meaning. 
25. The zah beleere ceremony is typical for the northern Mundang in the Kaele region; it is not 
found in the Lere region. 
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